Firm heterogeneity, international cooperations and export participation by Castellacci, Fulvio
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Firm heterogeneity, international
cooperations and export participation
Fulvio Castellacci
2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27585/
MPRA Paper No. 27585, posted 20. December 2010 19:33 UTC
 Firm heterogeneity, international cooperations 
and export participation 
 
 
 
 
Fulvio Castellacci  
 
Department of International Economics, 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI),  
POB 8159, Dep. 0033 Oslo, Norway 
E-mail address: fc@nupi.no 
Phone: +47-22994040 
 
 
 
 
NUPI Working Paper 781, Year 2010 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the relationship between firms’ international cooperation 
strategies and export decision. It proposes an extension of the recent class of models of 
firm heterogeneity and trade according to which prospective exporters must engage in a 
cooperation agreement with a foreign partner in order to favour their market access and 
distribution activities overseas. The paper analyses the empirical relevance of this model 
by means of a new survey dataset providing information on the internationalization 
activities of 814 Norwegian firms in the service sectors for the period 2004-2006. The 
econometric results point out that international cooperation, both on existing and on 
innovative products, is indeed an important factor to foster the firms’ decision to enter 
the export market.  
 
 
 
 
JEL codes: F10; F15; L24; O33 
 
 
Keywords: Export; firm heterogeneity; international cooperations; innovation; survey 
data 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A recent strand of literature in international economics investigates the reason why 
firms differ in terms of their propensity to enter foreign markets and their ability to do 
so. Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) represent two of the seminal 
papers in this new modelling literature on firm heterogeneity and international trade. In 
short, this class of models points out that, in order to commercialize their products 
overseas, enterprises must pay a sunk (export) costs: since firms are characterized by 
different productivity levels, only high productivity enterprises will be able to make this 
investment and become international, whereas most other firms will only produce for 
the domestic market.1   
At the same time as these new theoretical ideas were being proposed, a large number of 
applied contributions have analysed the empirical relevance of this class of models by 
making use of firm-level data for a number of different countries. The micro-
econometric literature on firm heterogeneity and international trade has found 
substantial support for the key ideas proposed by the Melitz-like models, and shown the 
great differences that characterize exporting firms vis-a-vis domestic enterprises. 
Specifically, this applied literature has to a large extent focused on two main sets of 
factors explaining firms’ export propensity. The first is enterprises’ productivity, which 
has been shown to be much larger for exporters than for domestic firms by a great 
number of contributions (Wagner, 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 
2007; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Moxnes, 2010). The second set of explanatory 
factors refers to firms’ innovative activities. The R&D intensity of firms and their 
innovative output (e.g. patents, commercialization of new products) have been found to 
                                                 
1 Further elaborations of this seminal idea have later been proposed by, among others, Bernard et al. 
(2003 and 2007), Costantini and Melitz (2007) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). See also the related 
model developed by Ekholm and Midelfart (2005). A survey of these theoretical models has recently been 
presented by Castellacci (2011). 
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be closely related to the enterprises’ performance in international markets (Aw et al., 
2007; Barrios et al., 2003; Roper and Lover, 2002; Lachenmaier and Wöbmann, 2006; 
Cassiman and Golovko, 2007; Damijan et al., 2008).  
Despite the great progress achieved by this recent strand of firm heterogeneity literature, 
one aspect that has not yet received proper attention is the strategy that is pursued by 
each firm in order to enter the export market. In other words, once a firm realizes to 
have a high enough productivity to pay the sunk export costs, how precisely does it 
organize in order to prepare for its export activities? What strategy does it adopt, and 
what obstacles or barriers to internationalization does it encounter while preparing to 
become an exporter? 
Our paper intends to shed new light on these questions by focusing on the relationship 
between firms’ international cooperation strategies and export decision. The paper 
argues that international cooperation agreements represent an important strategy that 
prospective exporters follow in order to favour their market access and distribution 
activities overseas. Specifically, we propose an extension of the recent class of models 
of firm heterogeneity and trade according to which prospective exporters must engage 
in a cooperation agreement with a foreign partner.  
The paper then analyses the empirical relevance of this model by means of a new survey 
dataset providing information on the internationalization activities of 814 Norwegian 
firms in the service sectors for the period 2004-2006. The econometric results point out 
that international cooperation, both on existing and on innovative products, is indeed an 
important factor to foster the firms’ decision to enter the export market.2  
                                                 
2 These insights are in line with the empirical results of a few papers that have recently investigated the 
role of vertical linkages and firms’ network activities on enterprises’ export performance (Beise-Zee and 
Rammer, 2006; Clausen and Pohjola, 2009; Alvarez et al., 2009; Laursen, 2009). 
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The contribution proposed by the paper to the firm heterogeneity literature is twofold. 
First, the study sheds new lights on the export decision process and the related firm 
internationalization strategy, rather than simply assuming that these only depend on a 
combination of firm’s productivity and sunk export costs. Secondly, the paper provides 
new firm-level evidence on the process of internationalization in the service sectors, 
which have frequently been neglected in the previous literature due to the lack of 
reliable data. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical 
model, section 3 the survey data and indicators, sections 4 and 5 the results of the 
empirical analysis, and section 6 concludes and outlines the main results of the work. 
 
 
2. The model 
Our theoretical framework proposes an extension of the recent class of models of firm 
heterogeneity and trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004) by 
pointing out the important role played by firms’ international cooperation strategies in 
fostering the enterprises’ export activities. The overall set up presented in this section 
follows closely Melitz (2003) heterogeneity model. In each sector, firms are assumed to 
have different productivity levels: those enterprises that are below a given productivity 
threshold are not able to pay the sunk export costs and will therefore only produce for 
the domestic market; by contrast, above this productivity threshold, firms will be able to 
pay the sunk export costs and hence commercialize their products overseas.  
Based on this framework, our extension of this type of heterogeneity models is to point 
out that those firms that are above the productivity threshold must engage in some type 
of cooperation agreement with foreign partners in order to gain market access and build 
up a distribution network abroad, which are necessary for the commercialization of their 
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products in international markets. Firms may either enter cooperation agreements with 
foreign partners to favour the commercialization of existing products, or also engage in 
collaborations to promote and sell their new (innovative) products in the foreign market. 
The cooperation strategy adopted by the firm will then affect its export propensity.3
In order to formalize this idea, we initially start from the same set up as the Melitz 
model. The cost function of each firm (measured in units of labour L) is specified as: 
 
L = f + Q/φ                                                                                                                   (1) 
 
where f is a fixed production cost, φ is the labour productivity of the enterprise, and Q/φ 
is its variable cost. In each market, firms face a demand curve where the elasticity of 
substitution between two goods, σ, is assumed constant. Hence, the firm sets a profit 
maximizing markup σ/(σ-1) = 1/ρ, and a pricing rule P(φ) = 1/(ρφ).4 The profit of the 
firm is thus: 
 
π(φ) = R(φ) – L(φ) = R(φ)/σ – f                                                                                  (2) 
 
where R(φ)/σ denotes the variable profits component. The key point of Melitz 
formalization is that firms have different productivity levels, which are determined by 
the (exogenous) probability distribution g(φ). The firm’s profits described in equation 2 
                                                 
3 While the idea presented here is general and may be relevant for many different industries of the 
economy, we believe it is an even more plausible hypothesis within the context of the service sectors, on 
which we focus in our empirical analysis. One relevant characteristic that has previously been pointed out 
in the literature on services is in fact the importance of user-producer interactions for service provision 
and commercialisation (so-called customisation, see Castellacci, 2008 and 2010). In terms of firms’ 
international activities, this may imply that, in order to develop a good knowledge of the foreign market 
and a close relationship to the users’ needs, service firms may find it necessary to undertake cooperation 
agreements with foreign enterprises in order to export their services overseas. 
 
4 As in Melitz (2003, p.1699), we here assume for simplicity that the wage rate at the numerator of the 
pricing rule expression equals 1. 
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are thus a function of its productivity, since an enterprise with greater productivity φ can 
charge a lower price and sell more output. Once a firm discovers its productivity, it 
decides whether to produce only for the domestic market or whether it is also able to 
pay the necessary sunk costs and thus sell its products abroad.5
At this point, we depart from Melitz model and propose our extension of it. The idea we 
introduce is the following. High productivity firms decide to enter the export market, 
but in order to do so they must do two things. First, they must pay a sunk export cost, fx. 
As previously observed in the literature, this is necessary in order to manage and 
overcome crucial barriers to international trade, such as regulatory obstacles, IPR 
management costs, skills and human capital requirements, etc. Secondly, prospective 
exporters must find an international cooperation partner in order to enhance their market 
access and distribution channels in the foreign market. Without a cooperation partner, 
high-productivity firms will not be able to start their export activity because they lack 
the information and distribution networks that are necessary to initiate their 
commercialization activities overseas.  
We further assume that each firm can adopt two different cooperation strategies: 
1. Either, it will try to sell its existing services in foreign markets by collaborating with 
an international partner. The main cooperation motive here is obviously market access 
and distribution. We call this strategy C (cooperation with a foreign partner). 
2. Alternatively, the firm may decide not only to sell its existing services in foreign 
markets, but also to sell its new (innovative) services by collaborating with a foreign 
innovative partner. The driving cooperation motive here is not simply market access and 
                                                 
5 Differently from Melitz, our model does not describe the case in which a firm does not even enter the 
domestic market because its low productivity does not make it possible to pay the fixed production costs. 
This is a convenient simplification that does not alter the model’s substance and results. In other words, 
we neglect the firm’s choice of whether or not enter the production process (analysed in Melitz, 2003, 
section 3), and instead focus on the firm’s choice between domestic versus foreign markets (as in Melitz, 
2003, sections 5 and 6). 
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distribution of existing products, but also the further development and foreign 
commercialization of new or improved product qualities. We call this strategy IC 
(cooperation with a foreign innovative partner). 
The cooperation strategy IC contains (and it is strictly superior to) the strategy C, in the 
sense that a firm choosing IC will enter a cooperation agreement that is composed of 
two parts: access/distribution of existing services (as in C), plus the commercialization 
of new services.6
The prospective exporters must therefore pay the following fixed (sunk) costs:  
• fx: sunk export costs: all firms aiming at export must pay this;  
• fC: for firms choosing strategy C;  
• fC + fIC: for firms choosing strategy IC. 
The sunk costs of international cooperation (fC and fIC) entail the costs for finding a 
partner, managing the contractual costs and mantaining the contact with the partner in 
the future. Here we reasonably assume that strategy IC is more costly than C, because 
undertaking and managing an innovation cooperation is expected to be more complex 
and demanding than an ordinary cooperation that only refers to the commercialization 
of existing products. 
Prospective exporters expect the following benefits from their exporting activity: 
• RC(φ): for firms choosing strategy C. This is the additional revenue that can be 
earned by means of a greater market access and distribution that is made possible by 
the international cooperation activity; 
                                                 
6 The empirical analysis of our firm-level dataset will later show the validity of the idea we are 
formalizing here. To anticipate, our data indicate that (1) nearly all exporting firms are engaged in some 
type of international cooperation; (2) enterprises adopting the strategy IC also cooperate on existing 
services (i.e. the strategy IC is stricly superior to C; in fact we never observe a firm that cooperates only 
on new services). 
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• RC(φ) + RIC(φ): for firms choosing strategy IC. This is the additional revenue that 
can be earned not only by means of a greater market access and distribution due to 
the international cooperation activity, but also thanks to the greater 
commercialization of new services. 
Hence, the model points out the existence of three distinct groups of firms: domestic 
(D), exporters with international cooperation (C), and exporters with international 
innovation cooperation (IC). The profits expected by each of these groups are: 
 
πD(φ) = R(φ)/σ – f                                                                                                        (3) 
 
πC(φ) = [R(φ)/σ + RC(φ)] – [f + fx + fC]                                                                       (4) 
 
πIC(φ) = [R(φ)/σ + RC(φ) + RIC(φ)] – [f + fx + fC+ fIC]                                                (5) 
 
where πD(φ), πC(φ) and πIC(φ) indicate respectively the profits of domestic firms (D), 
exporters with international cooperation (C) and exporters with international innovation 
cooperation (IC).  
It is reasonable to assume that RC(φ) > fC and RIC(φ) > fIC: if a firm chooses strategy C 
(or IC), the incremental revenues RC(φ) (or RIC(φ)) are greater than the additional costs 
fC (or fIC) that it has to pay to manage the cooperation agreement. This implies that: 
πD(φ) < πC(φ) < πIC(φ). Hence, the profits expected from adopting strategy C are higher 
than D, and those earned by undertaking strategy IC are greater than C.  
Given this set up, the factors affecting the firm’s choice of adopting a cooperation 
strategy instead of another are twofold. First, the strategy choice will depend on the 
additional profits that the firm may expect to earn. Specifically, as pointed out in 
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equations 3, 4 and 5, the additional profits that can be earned by entering a cooperation 
agreement with a foreign partner depend on: (1) the firm’s productivity level: the higher 
the productivity, the more likely is that the firm will decide to enter the export market 
and hence adopt cooperation strategy C or IC instead of D; (2) the sunk costs that must 
be paid to enter the foreign market, including both fx, fC and fIC. 
Secondly, the choice of the cooperation strategy will also be affected by the enterprise’s 
innovation status. Innovative firms have in fact a greater absorptive capacity than non-
innovative enterprises, and they therefore have a greater awareness of the importance of 
cooperation activity, and a superior capability to interact with external actors in order to 
gain access to foreign markets and advanced external knowledge. Further, if the firm 
has recently developed new products, the novelty and complexity of the latter may 
initially make it more difficult to introduce them in the foreign market, and hence make 
it necessary to enter a cooperation agreement in order to favour this commercialisation 
process. In summary: 
 
Pr{C} = s[RC(φ); fx; fC; INNO]                                                                                   (6) 
 
Pr{IC} = t[RC(φ); RIC(φ); fx; fC; fIC; INNO]                                                                (7) 
 
where Pr{C} and Pr{IC} are the probability to adopt cooperation strategy C or IC 
respectively, whereas INNO denotes the innovation status of the enterprise (INNO = 1 
for firms engaged in innovative activities, and 0 otherwise).7  
                                                 
7 It is important to emphasize that, according to this formalization, innovation and productivity are both 
exogenous variables of the model. This is due to the short-run nature of this theoretical framework, which 
for simplicity does not take into account the possibility that innovation and productivity may both evolve 
in the longer run by means of the firm’s R&D investments or learning effects in foreign markets. See the 
recent model by Costantini and Melitz (2007) in which firms may increase their future productivity by 
investing in innovative activities. 
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After having presented our proposed refinement of Melitz (2003) model, we follow 
again his formalization in order to outline the equilibrium condition and the main 
outcomes of this theoretical framework. Taking together the three groups of firms, each 
firm’s combined profits may be written as: 
 
πi = πD + max {0; πC} + max {0; πIC}                                                                          (8) 
 
where i = D for domestic firms, C for exporters engaged in international cooperation, 
and IC for exporters engaged in international innovation cooperation. Firm’s i value 
function is given by:8
 
υi(φ) = max {0; πi}                                                                                                       (9) 
 
The cutoff productivity levels are denoted by: 
 
φ* = inf {φ: υi(φ) > 0}                                                                                                (10) 
 
φX* = inf {φ: φ ≥ φ* and πX(φ)}                                                                                 (11) 
 
where φ* is the cutoff productivity level for production in (at least) the domestic market, 
while φX* is the productivity threshold  for prospective exporters (i.e. our C and IC 
firms) . These cutoff levels must be such that the profits that may be earned by the firm 
                                                                                                                                               
 
8 Equation 9, differently from Melitz model, does for simplicity assume that the probability that a firm 
exit at any period due to an exogenous shock is 0 (see Melitz, 2003, p. 1709). 
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with productivity φ* (or φX*) must equal zero (the so-called zero cutoff profit condition 
of Melitz model): 
 
πD(φ*) = 0                                                                                                                   (12) 
 
πX(φX*) = 0                                                                                                                 (13) 
 
Given these productivity thresholds, it is then possible to outline the distribution of 
productivity for incumbents (conditional upon successful entry): 
 
μ(φ) = g(φ) / [1 – G(φ*)]                                                                                            (14) 
 
where the term [1 – G(φ*)] represents the ex-ante probability of successful entry in the 
domestic market. Therefore, the ex-ante probability of successful entry in the foreign 
market is given by: 
 
Pr{X}  = [1 – G(φX*)] / [1 – G(φ*)]                                                                           (15) 
 
As shown above, the productivity thresholds that appear in this expression (φX* and φ*) 
are determined as a function of the firms’ profits πi. The latter, in turn, have previously 
been specified as a function of the following main factors (see equations 3, 4 and 5): (1) 
the firm’s productivity φ; (2) the fixed production costs f, and the sunk (export and 
cooperation) costs fC and fIC; (3) the cooperation strategy adopted by the firm, C or IC. 
Therefore, the export probability Pr{X} may be described as a function of these factors:  
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Pr{X}  = z[φ; f; fx; fC; fIC; C; IC]                                                                               (16) 
 
Specifically, our model expects that the probability that a firm becomes an exporter 
Pr{X} is related to these factors in the following manner: (1) positively related to the 
enterprise’s productivity level; (2) negatively related to the fixed production and sunk 
(export and cooperation) costs; (3) to be greater for the cooperation strategy IC than for 
the strategy C (since the former leads to higher average expected profits than the latter). 
In summary, the model leads to two main equations that will be investigated in the 
empirical analysis: one is the equation for the determinants of the firm’s international 
cooperation (equations 6-7 above); the other is the equation for the firm’s probability to 
become an exporter (equation 16). The empirical analysis presented in the reminder of 
the paper will first illustrate the empirical validity of some of the main model’s 
assumptions and properties, and then provide an econometric test of the two equations 
for the cooperation and export propensity.  
 
 
 
3. Data and indicators 
The Service Internationalization Survey (SIS) was carried out by the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs in the period 2008-2009. The motivation for 
undertaking the survey was to provide new empirical evidence on the main channels, 
strategies and patterns of internationalization followed by firms in the service industries. 
The data collection work was based on a questionnaire that was distributed to a large 
sample of Norwegian firms. The questionnaire is composed of 25 questions, which ask 
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Norwegian service enterprises a number of information regarding their international 
activities in the period 2004-2006. 
A web-based survey was sent to all Norwegian firms with more than 10 employees in 
14 different service industries. In total, the questionnaire was sent to a total number of 
4230 enterprises and, after a series of reminders during the whole data collection 
process, 814 enterprises filled in the questionnaire, corresponding to a satisfactory 
response rate of 19%.  
The 14 selected industries represent a wide coverage of the service branch of the 
economy, and contain both sectors characterized by a high international propensity as 
well as more domestically oriented industries (software; research and development; 
other business services; post and telecommunication; financial intermediation; 
insurance; auxiliary financial services; hotels and restaurants; sale, maintenance and 
repair; wholesale trade; retail trade; land transport; water transport; auxiliary transport 
services). Across the sectors, the response rate ranges from a minimum of 11% to a 
maximum of 35%. 
The SIS questionnaire comprises a number of questions regarding the different delivery 
modes of service firms in international markets, the type of clients and cooperation 
partners that these have had, the internationalisation motives and objectives, their 
innovative activities, and the main barriers to internationalisation experienced by the 
enterprises. Our empirical analysis focuses on the following indicators available from 
the SIS survey, whose main descriptive statistics are reported in table 1. 
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• Export participation: dummy variable indicating whether a firm has had export 
activity in the period 2004-2006. On average, 19% of enterprises in our sample is an 
exporter.9 
 
• International cooperation: dummy variable reporting whether the firm has 
cooperated with an international partner in the period. This measures the strategy C 
in the theoretical model presented in the previous section. 35% of firms have had 
this type of cooperation strategy. 
 
• International innovation cooperation: dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm, in addition to having cooperation agreements on existing services, have also 
cooperated with an international partner for the commercialization of a new service. 
This measures the strategy IC of our theoretical model. On average, 14% of 
enterprises in our sample have adopted this cooperation strategy. 
 
• Part of a group: dummy variable reporting whether the firm is part of a group 
rather than an independent enterprise.  
 
• Affiliate of a foreign MNE: dummy variable indicating whether the firm is an 
affiliate of a foreign multinational enterprise. 
 
• Size (employment): number of employees. 
 
                                                 
9 Notice that this variable only refers to export activities and excludes other channels of service 
internationalisation such as, for instance, FDI, foreign clients mobility and temporary presence abroad. In 
other words, among the four service internationalisation modes identified by GATS, the dummy variable 
used here only refers to mode 1. 
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• Labour productivity: Firm’s turnover divided by the number of employees. This 
provides a measure of the productivity variable φ of the theoretical model. 
 
• Innovation (new services): dummy variable reporting whether the firm has 
developed a new service in the period. This indicator measures the variable INNO of 
the theoretical model. 
 
• Barriers to internationalization: this is a set of five variables indicating the extent 
to which firms consider the following factors as important barriers to their 
internationalization activities: (1) Regulation of foreign business activities; (2) Lack 
of qualified workers; (3) Protection of intellectual property rights; (4) Infrastructure 
(communication, transport, distribution); (5) Costs of building up a network abroad. 
The indicators are categorical, ranging on a scale from 1 ("not important") to 4 
("very important"). These five variables provide a proxy measure of the sunk costs 
of export and international cooperation activity (i.e. the variables fx, fC, and fIC of 
our theoretical model). 
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis of the model’s assumptions and set up 
This section presents some descriptive evidence and statistical tests to illustrate the 
empirical validity of the main assumptions and properties of the theoretical model 
presented in section 2. The main novelty of our theoretical framework as compared to 
the standard trade and heterogeneity model is the idea that all prospective exporting 
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firms must engage in international cooperation in order to enable their 
commercialization activities overaseas, and that they may do that by following two 
alternative strategies: cooperation to favour the commercialization of existing products 
(C) or also to facilitate the export of innovative services (IC). Figures 1 and 2 show that 
these two cooperation strategies are indeed important for the service firms in our 
sample, and closely related to their export propensity and innovative status. 
First, figure 1 reports the share of firms adopting different cooperation strategies and the 
extent to which these are related to the enterprises’ export activities. The figure shows 
that nearly all exporters in our sample have also had some type of international 
cooperation agreement. This suggests that it is indeed reasonable to extend this class of 
models by focusing on firms’ cooperation strategies, as the latter appear to be an 
inherent and important part of firms’ activities overseas. In fact, the probability that a 
firm is an exporter is substantially higher for enterprises adopting strategy IC or C vis-a-
vis non-cooperating firms. 
Secondly, figure 2 shows the close relationship between the innovative status of the 
firms (INNO) and the international cooperation strategy they adopt (see equations 6 and 
7 of the theoretical model). The diagram clearly indicates that: (1) if a firm is an 
innovator, it is much more likely that it is engaged in some type of international 
cooperation (C or IC); (2) innovators are more likely to adopt strategy IC than C.  
 
< Figures 1 and 2 here > 
 
Next, we present the results of statistical tests that compare the export propensity and 
productivity levels for the three different groups of firms identified by our model: non-
cooperating enterprises (NC), exporters with international cooperation (C), and 
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exporters with international innovation cooperation (IC). Table 2 presents the results of 
a set of Mann-Whitney tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The former is a non-
parametric test comparing the mean across two groups of observations, whereas the 
latter is a test of stochatic dominance that does not only focus on the mean but compares 
the whole distribution for different groups of firms.10 The comparison exercise is 
repeated for each pair of groups: C versus NC (panel a of table 2), IC against NC (panel 
b), and IC versus C (panel c). 
First, looking at the results for the productivity variable, we observe that firms with 
international cooperations (C) and those with innovation cooperations (IC) have higher 
labour productivity than firms with no cooperation (see the table’s panels a and b 
respectively). These results provide empirical support for the trade and heterogeneity 
framework and for our extension of it. They show that firms are characterized by 
different productivity levels, and that these differences are particularly marked when 
comparing exporting to non-exporting firms (in terms of our theoretical model, this 
property may be expressed as: φC > φD and φIC > φD). This is in line with a great number 
of recent contributions in the applied literature on firm heterogeneity and trade 
(Wagner, 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 2007; Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007). 
However, the comparison of the groups IC and C (panel c of the table) is not 
statistically significant. The reason for this, according to our model, may be that the 
different strategies and performance of the groups C and IC are not only related to their 
productivity levels (which is for both groups above the necessary cutoff level), but they 
may also be affected by their innovation status (see equations 6 and 7). 
                                                 
10 In the recent applied literature on firm heterogeneity and exports, analogous tests have been used by, 
among others, Cassiman and Golovko (2007) and Damijan et al. (2008). See in particular the related firm-
level evidence on Norwegian manufacturing firms recently presented by Moxnes (2010). 
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Secondly, shifting the focus to the export participation variable, the test results clearly 
indicate that firms with international cooperations (C) and those with innovation 
cooperations (IC) have higher export propensity than firms with no cooperation (panels 
a and b). Furthermore, firms with innovation cooperations have higher export 
propensity than firms that only have international cooperations (panel c). These results 
are in line with our model’s prediction (see equation 16) that the probability to become 
an exporter is not only related to the factors previously pointed out in the literature, 
productivity and sunk costs, but it is also affected by the firm’s cooperation strategy.  
In summary, the results presented in this section illustrate the empirical validity of our 
model’s main assumptions and set up. Our sample is well described by distinguishing 
three groups of firms: domestic enterprises (D), exporters with international cooperation 
(C) and exporters with innovation cooperation (IC). Firms in the first group are not able 
to enter the export market because their productivity level is below the minimum cutoff 
level (as in Melitz model). On the other hand, the last two groups are both above the 
threshold productivity level, but must engage in a cooperation agreement with a foreign 
partner in order to enter the export market. These two groups differ however in terms of 
the cooperation strategy they adopt. Firms in the IC group are more likely to be 
innovators than enterprises in the C group, and have therefore on average a higher 
export propensity.  
 
< Table 2 here > 
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5. Empirical analysis of the model’s outcomes 
As outlined at the end of section 2, our theoretical model leads to two main equations, 
which are empirically investigated in the regression analysis presented in this section. 
One is the equation for the determinants of the firm’s international cooperation strategy 
(see equations 6-7 in section 2); the other is the equation for the firm’s probability to 
become an exporter (see equation 16). The empirical version of these two equations that 
will be considered here is the following: 
 
  Pr{CSi} = α + β φi + γ SCi + δ INNOi + κ FSi + ε1i                                                (17) 
 
  Pr{Xi} = η + θ φi + λ SCi + ω CSi + ξ FSi ε2i                                                          (18) 
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
 
• Pr{CSi} is the probability that firm i adopts a given cooperation strategy. CSi equals 
C if the firm has international cooperation only, and IC if the firm has also 
innovation cooperation; 
• Pr{Xi} is the probability that firm i is an exporter; 
• φi is the enterprise’s labour productivity;  
• SCi denotes the sunk (export and cooperation) costs (i.e. the variables fx, fC, fIC of 
the theoretical model). These are measured through the set of barriers to 
internationalization variables that have been defined in section 3; 
• INNOi represents the innovation status of the firm (it equals 1 for innovators, and 0 
otherwise); 
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• FSi is a set of firm-specific control variables (firm size; whether it is part of a group; 
and whether it is the affiliate of a foreign MNE).  
 
Taken together, equations 17 and 18 constitute a recursive system of equations, since 
the dependent variable in the first equation Pr{CSi} appears on the righ-hand-side of the 
second equation. We use two different econometric approaches to estimate these 
equations. The first is to estimate the two equations independently from each other by 
means of an ordinary probit model. This approach neglects the endogeneity of the CSi 
variable in equation 18 and it is therefore likely to provide biased estimates. It is 
however useful to present these probit results as a benchmark. The second econometric 
approach makes use of a recursive bivariate probit model, in which both equations are 
simultaneously estimated and the endogeneity of the CSi variable is properly handled by 
the way the model is estimated.11
Before presenting the econometric results, it is important to point out two simplifying 
assumptions, and possible limitations, of our empirical model. First, in line with Melitz 
(2003) model and our refinement of it, the productivity variable φi is assumed to be an 
exogenous factor, which firms take as given when they decide upon their cooperation 
and export strategies. Given the static nature of our theoretical model and the cross-
sectional nature of the survey data we are using, our empirical analysis is not able to 
take into account the possible endogeneity of the productivity variable in a longer time 
frame. Nevertheless, a large number of microeconometric studies have previously 
investigated the possible feedback effect linking firms’ international activities to their 
                                                 
11 The recursive bivariate probit is a seemingly unrelated regression model with correlated disturbances, 
in which the dependent variable of the first equation appears on the righ-hand-side of the second equation. 
The model is estimated by MLE. Greene (2003, section 21.6.6, pp. 715-716) points out that in such a 
model the endogeneity of one of the RHS variables of the second equation can be neglected because this 
term does not affect the maximization of the log-likelihood (differently from what it would be the case in 
a linear recursive model not estimated by MLE).  
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productivity dynamics, and often failed to find robust support for the learning-by-
exporting hypothesis (Wagner, 2007; Andersson and Loof, 2009). We therefore 
consider it reasonable to neglect this feedback effect in the context of our cross-
sectional investigation. 
Secondly, our model also assumes that the innovation status of the firm (INNOi, the 
dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm is an innovator) is an exogenous factor 
in equation 17. Similarly to the productivity variable, this is justified in the context of 
our static theoretical model and cross-sectional nature of the data at hand. The 
underlying idea is that, in any given period, an enterprise’s cooperation strategy will not 
affect its innovation status, because the latter is the result of choices and investments 
that the firm did in the past (e.g. to set up an R&D lab) and that cannot be affected and 
modified in the short run. However, this argument would certainly be less appropriate if 
we had the possibility to analyse a dynamic model by means of panel data, since in this 
case it would be reasonable to also investigate a possible feedback mechanism linking 
firms’ international cooperation strategies to their innovation activities. Finally, it is also 
important to notice the exclusion restriction that we introduce in order to identify the 
recursive bivariate probit model: the (exogenous) INNO variable enters equation 17 but 
is not included in equation 18. In other words, in line with our theoretical model, the 
econometric specification assumes that the innovation status of the firm affects the 
probability that this decides to collaborate with a foreign partner, but does not have any 
direct effect on the probability that the enterprise is an exporter. Therefore, the firm’s 
innovation status is assumed to have an indirect effect on its export propensity through 
the impacts it has on the cooperation strategy choice. 
The econometric results are presented in tables 3 and 4. Table 3 reports the results for 
equation 17, and table 4 for equation 18. The first two columns of each table focus on 
 21
the cooperation strategy C (international cooperation), whereas the other two focus on 
the strategy IC (international innovation cooperation). The numbers of the various 
columns indicate the econometric approach used in each case, namely ordinary probit 
(1.1 and 1.3; 2.1 and 2.3) and recursive bivariate probit (1.2 and 1.4; 2.2 and 2.4).12
Let us first look at the results for equation 17 reported in table 3. The labour 
productivity variable is positively and significantly related to both dependent variables, 
international cooperation (C) and innovation cooperation (IC), and its coefficient is 
stable across the regressions. The innovation dummy variable is also positive and 
significant. Its estimated coefficient illustrates the strong impact that innovation has on 
the choice of firms to engage in international cooperation activities (strategy C or IC). 
Besides, as pointed out in our theoretical framework, the firm’s innovation status has a 
stronger effect on the probability that an enterprise adopts strategy IC rather than C 
(compare columns 1.1 to 1.3, and 1.2 to 1.4).   
Among the barriers to internationalization variables, three of them turn out to have 
significant estimates: the protection of IPRs, which is a particularly relevant issue for 
service provision in international markets; the lack of infrastructures in the foreign 
market; and the costs of building up a network abroad (this variable is only significant 
for the dependent variable IC, though; see right-hand-side of table 3). Notice that these 
barriers variables are all positively related to the dependent variable. Our interpretation 
of these results, in line with analogous survey data exercises, is that firms which are 
more actively engaged in international markets are more likely to attach higher 
importance to these hampering factors, because they are more aware and have a better 
knowledge of the sunk costs that it is necessary to pay in order to enter the export 
market. 
                                                 
12 The LR tests reported at the bottom of tables 3 and 4 indicate that the hypothesis that the disturbances 
of the two equations are uncorrelated can be rejected. This supports the choice of estimating a bivariate 
version of the model instead of two separate probit models for the two equations.  
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Last, looking at the firm-specific control variables, the size of the enterprise and the 
foreign affiliate dummy indicator are both positively and significantly related to the 
enterprise’s decision to engage in an international cooperation agreement. By contrast, 
the part of a group dummy variable is not significant at conventional levels. It is 
important to control for this factor in equation 17, since this suggests that the choice of a 
firm to cooperate with an international partner is not mainly driven by the fact that the 
enterprise is part of a group (and hence connected to other firms within an already 
established conglomerate).13  
Table 4 shifts the focus to the results for equation 18, where the dependent variable is 
the export participation dummy indicator. The most important explanatory variable in 
this equation turns out to be the international cooperation strategy, namely C in columns 
2.1 and 2.2, and IC in columns 2.3 and 2.4. The international cooperation variable is 
highly significant in all the regressions, and its estimated impact on the export 
propensity increases substantially when the endogeneity of this variable is taken into 
account by means of the recursive bivariate probit model.14  
The labour productivity variable and the firm size (employment) control variable are 
also positively related to the export participation dummy, as previously found in the 
literature (Wagner, 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 2007; Greenaway 
                                                 
13 In additional regressions not reported in table 3, we have also estimated equation 17 by adding the 
export propensity (dummy) variable to the set of regressors, in order to control for the possibility of a 
feedback effect from firm’s export participation to their international cooperation strategy (i.e. firms may 
be more likely to enter new cooperation agreements if they are already present in, and have knowledge of, 
the foreign market). This feedback effect is not present in our theoretical (static) model, but it would be a 
plausible extension in the context of a dynamic model. This export-cooperation feedback effect turns out 
to be positive and significant in these additional regressions, and its inclusion does not alter any of the 
results for the other variables in equation 17. 
 
14 In another set of regressions not reported here, instead of using separately the two regressors C and IC, 
we have made use of the variable “Cooperation_strategy”, which combines C and IC together. This is a 
categorical variable taking three values: 0 for non-cooperating firms, 1 for firms adopting strategy C and 
2 for IC enterprises. The results of these regressions are basically the same as those reported in table 4 
here, but provide an additional relevant indication: the positive and significant estimate for the variable 
“Cooperation_strategy” confirms our theoretical model’s prediction that the probability to become an 
exporter is higher for firms adopting strategy IC than C (see equation 16 in section 2). 
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and Kneller, 2007; Altomonte and Colantone, 2008; Castellani and Giovannetti, 2010). 
However, the statistical precision of these results is somewhat lower than in previous 
papers in the firm heterogeneity applied literature. This is likely due to the fact that in 
our approach, besides the direct effect of productivity and firm size on export 
propensity, we also consider an indirect effect, since these two firm-specific variables 
are assumed to affect the firm’s cooperation strategy first (equation 17), and the latter 
does then have an impact on the enterprise’s export propensity (equation 18). Our 
econometric results suggest it may be difficult to obtain a precise estimate of these two 
distinct effects of productivity and firm size on export participation. 
Some of the barriers to internationalization variables turn out to be important for the 
export decision of enterprises: the regulation of business activities in foreign markets, 
the lack of qualified workers and the protection of IPRs. By contrast, the two variables 
measuring the lack of infrastructures in the foreign market and the costs of building up a 
network abroad do not turn out to have significant estimates, differently from it was the 
case in the results for equation 17. It is therefore interesting to observe that, among our 
set of barriers to internationalization variables, those measuring natural barriers 
(related to infrastructures and network building factors) are important for the firm’s 
choice of what cooperation strategy to adopt, whereas those measuring policy-imposed 
costs (e.g. regulatory factors) are more relevant for its export decision.  
 
< Tables 3 and 4 here > 
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6. Conclusions 
The paper has investigated the role of international cooperations for firms’ export 
decisions. The theoretical framework (section 2) has put forward an extension of the 
class of models of firm heterogeneity and international trade. The main idea we have 
introduced within the standard heterogeneity model is that an enterprise, once it realizes 
that its productivity is above a minimum cutoff level that is required to enter the export 
market, must not only pay the sunk export costs as previously pointed out in the 
literature, but it must also engage in a cooperation agreement with a foreign partner in 
order to favour its market access and distribution activities overseas. Specifically, our 
model argues that a prospective exporter can adopt two alternative international 
cooperation strategies: cooperation for the commercialization of existing products only, 
or also for the further development and commercialization of innovative (new) products. 
Such a cooperation strategy is one key factor affecting the export propensity of firms (in 
addition to the other factors previously pointed out in the literature such as productivity, 
firm size and sunk export costs). 
The paper has then investigated the empirical relevance of this theoretical framework by 
means of a new survey dataset providing information on the internationalization 
activities of 814 Norwegian firms in the service sectors for the period 2004-2006. After 
a brief description of the data and indicators (section 3), the empirical analysis has 
shown that the model’s set up and main properties closely resemble the characteristics 
of our firm-level sample (section 4). Our sample is well described by distinguishing 
three groups of firms: domestic enterprises (D), exporters with international cooperation 
(C) and exporters with innovation cooperation (IC). Firms in the first group are not able 
to enter the export market because their productivity level is below the minimum cutoff 
level (as in Melitz model). On the other hand, the last two groups are much more 
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productive than domestic firms and have of course a greater export propensity. 
However, in order to enter the export market, they must engage in a cooperation 
agreement with a foreign partner. Nearly all of the exporters in our sample, in fact, are 
also engaged in international cooperation agreements with foreign enterprises.  
We have then shown the empirical relevance of these model’s properties in a 
multivariate setting by estimating two equations, one for the firm’s cooperation decision 
and the other for its export propensity (section 5). The regression results point out three 
interesting results. First, international cooperation, both on existing and on innovative 
products, is indeed an important strategy to foster the firms’ decision to enter the export 
market. Secondly, differently from the previous literature on innovation and export, in 
our model innovation does not have a direct effect on the export decision but only an 
indirect impact, i.e. by affecting the firm’s choice of whether to engage in an 
international cooperation and of which cooperation strategy to adopt. Finally, the results 
for the barriers to internationalization variables, which represent our set of proxy 
measures for sunk costs, point out that those variables measuring natural barriers 
(related to infrastructures and network building factors) are important for the firm’s 
choice of what cooperation strategy to adopt, whereas those measuring policy-imposed 
costs (e.g. regulatory factors) are more relevant for its export decision. The only barrier 
variable that turns out to be important for both the cooperation and export decision is 
the protection of IPRs, which is indeed a particularly relevant obstacle for the provision 
of services in international markets. 
These results on the role of international cooperation as a complementary strategy to 
foster firms’ export participation open up new opportunities for future research in this 
field. One important limitation of this paper, in particular, needs to be addressed by 
future research. Due to the short-run nature of our theoretical model and the cross-
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sectional data we have used in the empirical analysis, we have assumed throughout the 
work that innovation and productivity are both exogenous variables in the model. While 
this is a reasonable asumption in the context of a short-run model and cross-sectional 
investigation, it is clear that these variables are endogenous factors in a longer time 
frame. The challenge ahead is therefore to refine the main idea presented in this paper 
by means of a dynamic model framework in which both innovation and productivity 
may in turn be affected by the firm’s cooperation and export activities, and to test the 
empirical relevance of the various feedback mechanisms by means of a panel dataset. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export  
participation 
 
809 
 
.193 
 
.394 
 
0 
 
1 
 
International  
cooperation 
 
814 
 
.350 
 
.477 
 
0 
 
1 
 
International  
innovation cooperation 
 
814 
 
.144 
 
.351 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Part of  
a group 
 
801 
 
.518 
 
.499 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Affiliate of  
a foreign MNE 
 
764 
 
.171 
 
.377 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Size  
(employment) 
 
805 
 
68.9 
 
223.2 
 
10 
 
4861 
 
Labour  
productivity 
 
804 
 
.142 
 
.165 
 
0 
 
1.1 
 
Innovation 
(new services) 
 
814 
 
.321 
 
.467 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Barrier: Regulation of 
foreign business activities 
 
782 
 
1.65 
 
.954 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Lack of  
qualified workers 
 
783 
 
1.74 
 
.977 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Protection of 
intellectual property rights 
 
782 
 
1.44 
 
.768 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Infrastructure 
(commun., transp., distrib.) 
 
782 
 
1.83 
 
1.08 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Costs of building up 
a network abroad 
 
784 
 
2.00 
 
1.15 
 
1 
 
4 
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Figure 1: Relationship between international cooperation and export participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No cooperation: 
412 (51%) 
Cooperation: 
285 (35%) 
Innovation coop: 
117 (14%) 
No export: 
361 (45%) 
Export: 
51 (6%) 
No export: 
63 (8%) 
Export: 
54 (6%) 
Whole sample: 
814 (100%) 
No export: 
233 (29%) 
Export: 
52 (6%)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between international cooperation and innovation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not innovators: 
553 (68%) 
Innovators: 
261 (32%) 
No cooperation: 
292 (36%) 
Cooperation: 
225 (28%) 
Cooperation: 
60 (7%) 
No cooperation: 
120 (15%) 
Innovation coop: 
36 (4%) 
Innovation coop: 
81 (10%) 
Whole sample: 
814 (100%) 
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Table 2: Differences in export propensity and labour productivity according to firms’ 
cooperation strategies 
 
 
a. International cooperation (C) versus no cooperation (NC) 
 
 
     
     Mann-Whitney test 
 
       Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
 z-score Probability{C>NC} D-stat P-value 
Export  
participation 9.46*** 0.362 0.27 0.000 
Labour 
productivity 
 
4.41*** 
 
0.398 
 
0.20 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
b. International innovation cooperation (IC) versus no cooperation (NC) 
 
 
       
   Mann-Whitney test  
 
       Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
 z-score Probability{IC>NC} D-stat P-value 
Export 
participation 8.11*** 0.339 0.32 0.000 
Labour 
productivity 
 
3.54*** 
 
0.395 
 
0.21 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
c. International innovation cooperation (IC) versus international cooperation (C) 
 
 
      
   Mann-Whitney test 
 
       Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
 z-score Probability{IC>C} D-stat P-value 
Export  
participation 2.87** 0.416 0.16 0.031 
Labour 
productivity 
 
1.25 
 
0.455 
 
0.11 
 
0.325 
 
 
Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%. 
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Table 3: Regression results for the first equation. Dependent variables: International 
cooperation (C) and international innovation cooperation (IC) 
 
  1.1 
 
1.2 
 
1.3 
 
1.4 
 Probit 
 
Recursive 
bivariate probit 
 
Probit Recursive bivariate probit 
Dependent 
variable  
 
C 
 
C 
 
IC 
 
IC 
 
Labour  
productivity (log) 
 
0.402 
(5.09)*** 
 
0.394 
(4.99)*** 
 
0.401 
(3.84)*** 
 
0.353 
(3.39)*** 
 
Innovation 
(new services) 
 
0.611 
(4.75)*** 
 
0.688 
(5.50)*** 
 
0.816 
(5.49)*** 
 
0.924 
(6.25)*** 
 
Barrier: Business  
regulation  
 
0.071 
(0.91) 
 
0.073 
(0.93) 
 
-0.106 
(1.15) 
 
-0.085 
(0.92) 
 
Barrier: Lack of  
qualified workers 
 
-0.052 
(0.65) 
 
-0.048 
(0.59) 
 
0.047 
(0.51) 
 
0.039 
(0.42) 
 
Barrier: IPR  
protection  
 
0.187 
(1.96)** 
 
0.203 
(2.10)** 
 
0.183 
(1.84)* 
 
0.181 
(1.78)* 
 
Barrier: Lack of 
infrastructure  
 
0.198 
(2.76)*** 
 
0.184 
(2.53)** 
 
0.186 
(2.29)** 
 
0.158 
(1.93)* 
 
Barrier: Costs of 
building up a 
network abroad 
 
0.090 
(1.24) 
 
0.083 
(1.14) 
 
0.184 
(2.16)** 
 
0.187 
(2.20)** 
 
Employment  
(log) 
 
0.286 
(3.22)*** 
 
0.280 
(3.16)*** 
 
0.303 
(2.67)*** 
 
0.215 
(1.85)* 
 
Part of  
a group 
 
0.180 
(1.34) 
 
0.143 
(1.10) 
 
-0.073 
(0.44) 
 
-0.088 
(0.53) 
 
Affiliate of  
a foreign MNE 
 
0.488 
(2.91)*** 
 
0.462 
(2.78)*** 
 
0.331 
(1.67)* 
 
0.366 
(1.88)* 
 
 
(Pseudo) R-
squared 
 
0.219 - 0.273 - 
LR test  
of exogeneity - 5.79** - 5.12** 
 
Observations 
 
607 604 595 604 
 
All regressions include a constant and industry dummies. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Table 4: Regression results for the second equation. Dependent variable: Export 
participation  
 
  2.1 
 
2.2 
 
2.3 
 
2.4 
 
 
 
Probit 
 
Recursive 
bivariate probit 
 
Probit Recursive  bivariate probit 
International  
cooperation 
 
0.795 
(5.61)*** 
 
1.543 
(5.75)*** 
 
  
International  
innovation cooperation 
 
  
0.718 
(4.55)*** 
 
1.446 
(4.81)*** 
 
Labour  
productivity (log) 
 
0.243 
(2.58)** 
 
0.077 
(0.75) 
 
0.286 
(3.09)*** 
 
0.170 
(1.75)* 
 
Barrier: Business  
regulation  
 
0.110 
(1.39) 
 
0.092 
(1.15) 
 
0.139 
(1.74)* 
 
0.155 
(1.92)* 
 
Barrier: Lack of  
qualified workers 
 
0.135 
(1.64) 
 
0.184 
(2.23)** 
 
0.095 
(1.17) 
 
0.139 
(1.69)* 
 
Barrier: IPR  
protection  
 
0.197 
(2.13)** 
 
0.167 
(1.74)* 
 
0.212 
(2.32)** 
 
0.202 
(2.13)** 
 
Barrier: Lack of 
infrastructure  
 
0.047 
(0.64) 
 
-0.061 
(0.79) 
 
0.058 
(0.81) 
 
-0.024 
(0.32) 
 
Barrier: Costs of building 
up a network abroad 
 
0.097 
(1.24) 
 
0.047 
(0.60) 
 
0.104 
(1.35) 
 
0.048 
(0.60) 
 
Employment  
(log) 
 
0.192 
(1.93)* 
 
0.038 
(0.36) 
 
0.249 
(2.59)** 
 
0.145 
(1.42) 
 
 
(Pseudo) R-squared 
 
0.243 - 0.225 - 
LR test  
of exogeneity - 5.79** - 5.12** 
 
Observations 
 
652 604 652 604 
 
All regressions include a constant and industry dummies. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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